The battle marks the first significant time that Australia and New Zealand made war as coherent entities and not as mere colonies or geographic subdivisions of the British Empire. The battle helps form the common history that helped the two countries reinforce their identities as newly post-colonial countries. The performance of Kemal Ataturk in Gallipoli and in the war gave him the stature necessary to take control of Turkey in 1920 and remake it in a secular, pro-Western image.
The battle marks the first significant time that Australia and New Zealand made war as coherent entities and not as mere colonies or geographic subdivisions of the British Empire. The battle helps form the common history that helped the two countries reinforce their identities as newly post-colonial countries. The performance of Kemal Ataturk in Gallipoli and in the war gave him the stature necessary to take control of Turkey in 1920 and remake it in a secular, pro-Western image.
But is there a constitutional difference between the authorization of force and a declaration of war? Henke at QandO says that there is a meaningful distinction. I have to disagree.
The declaration of war in US history didn't require greater than majority support, so an authorization of force is not an attempt to avoid a constitutionally-mandated supermajority requirement. It seems to me to be a matter of wording, rather than of missing any constitutionally mandated element.
I'd compare it to the US census. It's authorized by Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, but there it's called an enumeration. The word census only appears once in the Constitution, down in Article I, Section 9. Is the US Census unconstitutional because the name is different? I would say no, because the actual wording is not important, it's the meaning of the words. We could call it the Great Counting and it would still be the same thing required under Article I.
An authorization of force is Congressional approval for military excursions, which is what I believe the founders planned for, and what the Constitution actually requires. This is a political distinction, but I would say not a Constitutional distinction.
Admiral Nelson decided to forgo the customary two opposing lines and instead formed the British ships into two close parallel lines moving perpendicular against the French & Spanish line of ships. His strategy allowed faster communication among the fleet, and even though slow winds meant the British ships were at first outmatched and outdistanced, the battle quickly developed into ship-to-ship combat. The British ships, though outnumbered, outclassed and outgunned the French and Spanish in straight matchups. The innovative, simplistic battle plan eliminated traditional strategy and maneuvers to capitalize on superior training and motivation of the British.
But the story's incomplete without Admiral Nelson himself. A heroic leader, lionized to this day by many English, it was Nelson's pre-battle signal that survives as the inspirational moment of the entire war (from the British perspective).
Before the battle, Nelson ordered signal flags to communicate to his fleet: "England Expects That Every Man Will Do His Duty." The message is still repeated in great Britain today, especially the first two words.
Though the British of 1805 were enemies of America, happy anniversary for a stunning victory in defense against invaders.

An interesting graphic, since it shows that the richest zip codes send the most troops (in addition to paying the most taxes). If we're talking about spreading out the burden of who fights or who pays for the fighting then we'd have to be talking about making poorer people enlist more and pay more.
What makes it interesting in the broadest sense is that the Germans thought of it at all. More on that later, though.
Here's how blitzkrieg worked. First, you acknowledge the central thesis of blitzkrieg: the schwerpunkt, or focus point. This was the point on the battlefield where maximum effort was to be quickly and mrcilessly concentrated in order to produce a breakthrough to exploit. While the French, British and Americans had very orthodox, uncreative theories about mechanized warfare (tanks) that involved conventional deployment and non-mixed tank units, the Germans realized that concentrating power allowed them to overwhelm opponents. It's the simple maxim of divide and conquer.
Second, the German theory of fast-tank warfare depended on mechanized infantry and artillery. The tanks, troops and heavy guns had to move from place to place quickly in order to exploit breakthroughs. Though the tanks were critical to the overall strategy and ubiqitous to the while practice of blitzkrieg, it was mixing mechanized infantry (troop transport, meaning trucks and half-tracks) and self-propelling artillery in with the tanks that made the strategy so powerful. The strategy was also used in conjunction with air force domination of the skies, and bombarding the schwerpunkt. Sometimes the use of parachustist troops was included, with the logic that the advancing troops would continue an aggressive advance in order to relieve parachutist comrades threatened far behind enemy lines. But the mechanized infantry (and artillery) allowed a full-fledged force to exploit the breakthroughs, rather than a more limited force of only tanks.
Thus it was that the Germans could put the full range of military force begind enemy lines; concentrated forces and mechanizd mixed elements were the key.

They would start out approaching the focus point (schwerpunkt) with ground forces and air force.

Then, when they achieved breakthrough (due to surprise, to concentration and to airpower) they would advance to the next line, whether it was reinforcements, artillery or whatever.

After breaking through the artillery, the aggressors proceed to the supply, command and communications units. By now the first line is reacting to the breakthrough and trying to close the gap. In doing so, they will begin to be encircled by the aggressors and forced into defensive pockets.

The command posts abandoned or destroyed, communication and supplies are now captured or obliterated. The front lines, moving into smaller pockets for defense from the enemy they now see to the front, side and back, will not be resupplied or get new orders. They'll be confused, slow to react, separated from the rest of their force by the breakthrough panzers and cut off from command and supply by the tanks.
One key innovation here is that individual commanders are given lattitude to achieve a goal as they see fit. They're chosen for their cretivity, drive, intelligence and grasp of the overall battlefield, as well as the more traditional traits of loyalty and grasp of a small part of the battle. Their superiors tell them the goals, mission and targets, but then the commanders have flexibility and responsibility in bringing about a victory. They can see the situation change, encounter enemies different from those in the intel report, or generally have to adapt to an unforeseen (or unforeseeable) event.
Fighting tens or hundreds of miles from the front line, the commanders would often have limited recourse from central command, which would have a hard time sending orders back and forth without a direct knowledge of what was happening on the ground. Although the German forces were all equipped with tactical radios, this was more useful to the commanders in the field than the higher-ups further back. The leaders had to be able to manage their own soldiers.
That's why blitzkrieg strategy was so suurpising to come from Germany: even though it was heavy on planning and strategy, it was reliant on flexibility and the autonomy of lower-level commanders. German economy and life are generally very focused on order and discipline, but the type of officers best suited to blitzkrieg would be more autonomous and creative.
Blitzkrieg ended up not being enough for Germany after it was misapplied by Hitler (after the initial phases of the war) and thank goodness for that. But the fundamental ideas were still groundbreaking, even if fundamentally un-German.


